University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2015

Tensions between Antitrust and Industrial Policy
D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida Levin College of Law, sokold@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1247 (2015),
available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/746

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

2015]

1247

TENSIONS BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND INDUSTRIAL
POLICY
D. Daniel Sokol*

INTRODUCTION
Sound antitrust law and policy is in tension with industrial policy. Antitrust promotes consumer welfare whereas industrial policy promotes government intervention for privileged groups or industries. Unfortunately,
industrial policy seems to be alive and well both within antitrust law and
policy and within a broader competition policy worldwide. This Article
identifies how industrial policy impacts both antitrust and competition policy. It provides examples from the United States, Europe, and China of how
industrial policy has been used in antitrust. However, this Article also
makes a broader claim that the overt or subtle use of industrial policy in
antitrust and competition policy is a global phenomenon. The United
States’ experience teaches that industrial policy can be pushed to the margins in antitrust (and the failure to push industrial policy to the margins
produces economic inefficiencies). Further, successful competition advocacy can reduce the competitive distortions that industrial policy may have on
competition policy more broadly.
This Article first identifies the relationship between antitrust and industrial policy, providing examples of industrial policy from the antitrust
experiences of the United States, Europe, and China. Second, it explores
how a lack of procedural fairness in antitrust may be abused by inefficient
competitors as a way to push industrial-policy goals. Third, this Article
demonstrates how industrial policy hurts a broader competition policy and
suggests potential competition-advocacy interventions on the part of antitrust authorities to limit the anticompetitive effects of such policy. The Article concludes with the suggestion that industrial policy is fundamentally in
tension with promoting consumer welfare and fostering long-term economic growth and should be both explicitly and implicitly extracted from the
antitrust enterprise. Further, antitrust agencies should implement more
competition-advocacy interventions to stop the spread of industrial policy
in antitrust globally.

* Professor of Law, University of Florida and Senior Of Counsel, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich &
Rosati. I have represented Google, although all the writing and assumptions in this article are my own.
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THE RELATIONSHIP OF ANTITRUST AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

Industrial policy threatens consumer welfare.1 Yet, determining the
scope of industrial policy may sometimes prove to be a challenge because
industrial policy has multiple meanings.2 For purposes of this Article, industrial policy means political interference either within antitrust or from
outside of antitrust (such as through the political process or sector regulation), in which economic analysis that is not based on antitrust economics
may shape antitrust enforcement. Optimal antitrust enforcement requires
that political factors not play a part of antitrust and that a technocratic antitrust3—characterized by economically justified outcomes, predictability,
administrability, and respect for due process and transparency—be the driving forces of enforcement. Additionally, antitrust should try to limit the
political impulse based on interest group capture in other parts of government as part of a broader competition policy to improve national competitiveness.4
Across the world, industrial policy asserts a more central position in
antitrust enforcement than in the United States.5 Such situations allow for
implicit intrusions of industrial policy, as agencies may be able to strategically pick and choose the economics that they adopt based on the outcome,
reverse engineering a decision.6 In other situations, industrial policy sneaks
in more subtly, due to case law that supports agencies with aggressive enforcement because such case law was based in part on industrial-policy
goals.7 In some systems, competitor effects still have some significance in

1

See John Fingleton, Competition Policy and Competitiveness in Europe, in COMPETITION LAW

AND ECONOMICS: ADVANCES IN COMPETITION POLICY ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU AND NORTH AMERICA

300, 301-04 (Abel M. Mateus & Teresa Moreira eds., 2010) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS]; Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Policy and Industrial Policy: A View from the U.S., in
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra, at 320, 328.
2 See generally Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol, Introduction to
COMPETITION AND THE STATE 1, 1-12 (Thomas K. Cheng, Ioannis Lianos & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2014) [hereinafter COMPETITION AND THE STATE] (providing a series of viewpoints on antitrust and
industrial policy broadly defined).
3 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (2008).
4 Australia’s Hilmer Report provides such an example. See Deborah Healey, Australian Experience with Competition Law: The State as a Market Actor, in COMPETITION AND THE STATE, supra note
2, at 205, 209-11. Another example is the competition-advocacy work of the FTC. See Todd J. Zywicki
& James C. Cooper, The US Federal Trade Commission and Competition Advocacy: Lessons for Latin
American Competition Policy, in COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 351, 356-61 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2009).
5 See White, supra note 1, at 320.
6 D. Daniel Sokol, What Drives Merger Control? How Government Sets the Rules and Play, in
COMPETITION AND THE STATE, supra note 2, at 89, 92.
7 Mats A. Bergman et al., Merger Control in the European Union and the United States: Just the
Facts, 7 EUR. COMPETITION J. 89, 119-21 (2011) (comparing US and European merger enforcement and
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antitrust analysis.8 At some level, this focus on competitors rather than on
competition is a form of industrial policy because it may favor outcomes
inconsistent with consumer welfare.9
A.

Industrial Policy Within Antitrust and as an Outside Pressure of a
Broader Competition Policy

Government may intervene in the economy both within an antitrust
system and outside of it.10 An antitrust regime that makes economic analysis
of competitive effects the sole method for analyzing consumer harm removes political factors from the analysis, shifting discretion from antitrust
authorities to the market.11 That is, the market will determine winners and
losers rather than antitrust policy. From a normative standpoint, this is more
desirable because the incorporation of fairness-related concerns may lead to
results that hurt consumers.12 This is true in part because “fairness” is a
highly variable concept.13
Professors Phillip Areeda and Donald Turner identified fairness as “a
vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens to favor.”14 Fairness in
antitrust can be misapplied by less efficient competitors to promote their
own goals at the expense of consumers.15 These special interests can capture

finding more aggressive enforcement in Europe, perhaps because economists traditionally played a less
pivotal role until the 2000s in Europe).
8 See Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit, Art of the Deal: The Merger Settlement Process at
the Federal Trade Commission, 70 S. ECON. J. 977, 995 (2004) (discussing the inefficiencies of competitor complaints and noting that “[t]he FTC’s preferences, although somewhat difficult to establish,
indicate that when it has the opportunity, the Commission is more likely to prefer that efficient acquisitions be abandoned rather than move forward with a compromise settlement. This result is compatible
with a capture theory of the bureaucracy and perhaps suggests that the FTC should be more critical of
competitor complaints”).
9 See, e.g., Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, s. 1.1 (Can.); Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 2
(S. Afr.), amended by Competition Second Amendment Act 39 of 2000; Wal-Mart Stores Inc. &
Massmart Holdings Ltd., Case No. 73/LM/Nov10 (S. Afr. Competition Trib. May 31, 2011) (providing
an application in the merger setting).
10 See Thomas W. Ross, Recent Canadian Policy Towards Industry: Competition Policy, Industrial Policy and National Champions, in COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 332,
332-36; White, supra note 1, at 320-21.
11 See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2497, 2529 (2013) [hereinafter Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards].
12 See id. at 2510.
13 See Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in THE
GOALS OF COMPETITIVE LAW 3, 5 & n.4 (Daniel Zimmer ed., 2012).
14 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPALS AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 111d (4th ed. 2015); see also Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969-70 (2001).
15 See Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2505-06.
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the antitrust system and antitrust enforcers, whom such competitors can
misuse for their personal aims to extort protection.16
Antitrust is not an effective mechanism for these sorts of fairness
trade-offs.17 Other areas of regulation are better suited to addressing such
trade-offs than antitrust.18 Embracing antitrust economics promotes greater
predictability and outcomes that are less likely to be hijacked by overtly
political concerns not based on competition economics, which allows for
better predictability in antitrust and a narrow focus on what antitrust does
best—promote consumer welfare.
Some of the introduction of industrial policy in antitrust is due to the
particular language of the enacting legislation that provides for multiple and
sometimes competing goals for antitrust.19 The original statutory schemes of
many antitrust regimes contained multiple goals.20 These goals may create a
path dependency in the case law, which then favors antitrust intervention
even when such behavior may be economically justified on efficiency
grounds.21 The good news is that most jurisdictions have adopted an antitrust-economics-driven goal (most often consumer welfare) as the sole criterion for antitrust analysis, with other goals falling by the wayside.22 Yet,
even when industrial policy is not explicitly used (or no longer used) in
antitrust law, in practice, its implicit use regularly occurs in many jurisdictions around the world due to this path dependency in the case law because
bad old cases remain good case law until they are overturned.23
16

See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L.
& ECON. 247, 250 (1985).
17 See Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2505-06.
18 Id.
19 See Unilateral Conduct Working Grp., Int’l Competition Network [ICN], Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and StateCreated Monopolies, at 38 (May 2007), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads
/library/doc353.pdf.
20 See id. at 89.
21 See infra notes 23-30.
22 See Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2506-09 (detailing this occurrence in
the United States); Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust:
An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 472-73 (2012).
23 See Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2501-02 (explaining the path dependency in Europe). The US Supreme Court recently articulated how antitrust jurisprudence can be fixed
over time. Justice Kagan explained:
This Court has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act.
Congress, we have explained, intended that law’s reference to “restraint of trade” to have “changing
content,” and authorized courts to oversee the term’s “dynamic potential.” We have therefore felt relatively free to revise our legal analysis as economic understanding evolves and . . . to reverse antitrust
precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences. Moreover, because the question in
those cases was whether the challenged activity restrained trade, the Court’s rulings necessarily turned
on its understanding of economics. Accordingly, to overturn the decisions in light of sounder economic
reasoning was to take them “on [their] own terms.”
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US Experience of Industrial Policy in Antitrust

Much of US antitrust enforcement from the 1950s and 1960s is an embarrassment by today’s standards.24 Back then, big was bad,25 merger efficiencies were ignored,26 vertical restraints were per se illegal,27 there was
tightening of rules for refusals to deal,28 intellectual property was subject to
the nine no-nos,29 horizontal restraints were unnecessarily applied,30 and the
Robinson-Patman Act31 was aggressively enforced.32 In all of these cases,
industrial policy that favored inefficient competitors was both a fundamental part of case law and government-enforcement priorities.33 Such econom-

Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, No. 13-720, slip op. at 14 (U.S. June 22, 2015) (citations omitted).
24 Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 217, 217 (2010) (“Forty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court simply did not know what it was
doing in antitrust cases.”).
25 See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278-79 (1966); United States v. Phila.
Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345-46
(1962); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[G]reat industrial
consolidations are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results.”).
26 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies
cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition.”).
27 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 373 (1967).
28 See Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959).
29 Bruce B. Wilson, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Patent and Know-How License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6, 1970), in ANTITRUST PRIMER: PATENTS, FRANCHISING, TREBLE DAMAGE SUITS 11,
12-14 (Sara-Ann Sanders ed., 1970).
30 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972).
31 Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
32 See Roger D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, “Antitrust’s Least Glorious Hour”: The RobinsonPatman Act, 57 J.L. & ECON. 201, 205-07 (2014); Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie
and the Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & ECON. 427, 433 (1978); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson Patman, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 12-13) (on file with
author).
33 This entrenched industrial policy negatively impacted antitrust coherence and welfare. See 1
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 110 (3d ed. 2006) (“The biggest advantages conferred by the use
of relatively traditional microeconomics as the guiding principle for antitrust are two: coherence and
welfare. . . . [P]opulist goals should be given little or no independent weight in formulating antitrust
rules and presumptions. As far as antitrust is concerned, they are substantially served by a procompetitive policy framed in economic terms. . . . [I]njection of populist goals, by broadening the proscriptions
of business conduct, would multiply legal uncertainties and threaten inefficiencies not easily recognized
or proved.”).
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ically misguided and aggressive enforcement hurt American competitiveness and contributed to America’s economic malaise.34
This approach in US case law began to change in the late 1970s, although the change in merger case law lagged behind the abolition of per se
rules regarding conduct.35 Overt political antitrust considerations (i.e., those
not based on antitrust economics) are no longer part of the current antitrust
policy discourse within the case law or agency practices. In the United
States, antitrust liability has narrowed due to a better understanding of economics,36 and antitrust analysis is now driven by economic analysis.37 As
Leah Brannon and Judge Douglas Ginsburg have noted regarding this development:
Even in such cases where there is no consensus among economists, there is, nevertheless,
virtually universal agreement among antitrust economists and lawyers alike, that the Court
should answer questions of antitrust law with reference to economic competition—matters of
consumer welfare and economic efficiency—rather than make political judgments about such
economically irrelevant matters as the “freedom of traders,” or “the desirability of retaining
38
‘local control’ over industry and the protection of small businesses.”

This transformation in case law has rendered anachronistic certain
doctrines that were not based on a modern economic understanding.39
34

See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2185 (2013) (“The old rules each likely deterred more anticompetitive
conduct than the corresponding modern rules do now. But in general, the rules were modified for a good
reason: they chilled cost reductions and other efficiency-enhancing conduct.”).
35 See Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise, 100 IOWA
L. REV 2039, 2050-51 (2015).
36 See William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal
Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 53-55 (2000).
37 See Liran Einav & Jonathan Levin, Empirical Industrial Organization: A Progress Report, 24 J.
ECON. PERSP. 145, 152 (2010) (“Thirty years ago, it was common for antitrust arguments to rest on
simple summary measures of industry structure such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl-Hirschman
indices. Nowadays, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which are tasked with
reviewing proposed mergers, commonly undertake sophisticated econometric studies to define industry
boundaries and to assess the likelihood of price increases or collusive behavior following a merger.
These exercises often draw on academic research, and in turn have motivated the development of new
empirical models.”); Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift in Antitrust Laws, Economics, and Enforcement, 7 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 733, 773-74 (2011) (finding evidence of structural shifts to economic analysis
across mergers and conduct cases); Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Symposium: 100 Years of Standard Oil Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 439 (2012) (“The evolution of antitrust has been
shaped by changing lines of economic thinking and ideologies.”); Sokol, supra note 32 (manuscript at
42-43) (finding a structural shift in Robinson-Patman enforcement based on the use of economic analysis in the predatory-pricing context).
38 Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to
2007, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, no. 2, 2007, at 22 (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
151 (1968); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962)).
39 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907
(2007) (overturning per se prohibition of minimum resale price maintenance (RPM)); State Oil
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Changes in priorities became embedded not merely in case law but also in
agency practice with the rise in the importance of economics (and economists) in agency analysis.40 In terms of how incentives impact the role of
industrial policy in antitrust, discretion in the hands of lawyers will play out
differently than in those of economists because discretion influences how
centrally economic analysis will factor into case selection.41 Professor Luke
Froeb and his colleagues explain that “[e]conomic methodology is particularly well suited for predicting the causal effects of business practices and
for determining the effects of counterfactual scenarios that are used to determine liability and damages.”42 If economic analysis forms the basis of
enforcement decisionmaking, effects become the focus.43 In this sense,
overt political control can be removed from case analysis because economic
inquiry is guided more by empirics.44 Lawyers, as part of an investigative
team, may be less driven by the empirics of economics.45 As a result, more
overt political goals might factor into their analyses.46
This is not to say that economists are not subject to political motivation.47 However, economists exercise it less than lawyers because populism
was never part of industrial organization’s mantra.48 The greater institutionalization of economics as the central motivation for antitrust may have been
a causal factor that changed the role of nonantitrust government intervention in antitrust.49 In particular, one can see this change in merger control

Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18-19 (1997) (overturning per se prohibition of maximum RPM); Cont’l T. V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-58 (1977) (overturning per se prohibition of vertical nonprice restraints).
40 Malcolm B. Coate, A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers, 14
ECON. & POL. 1, 7-10 (2002) [hereinafter Coate, Test]; William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its
Future Influence on Global Competition Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1157, 1167-68 (2015); Damien J. Neven, Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe, 21 ECON. POL’Y 741, 760, 780 (2006).
41 Luke M. Froeb et al., The Economics of Organizing Economists, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 57374 (2009).
42 Id. at 573.
43 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant
Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2007) [hereinafter Kovacic, Intellectual DNA].
44 See Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Evidence-Based Antitrust Enforcement in
the Technology Sector, Prepared Remarks at the Competition Law Center in Beijing, China 2-5 (Feb.
23, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/biographies/joshua-d-wright/speeches-articles-testimonies
?field_date_value[value][date]=2013&field_public_statement_type_tid=All&page=1.
45 Fred S. McChesney et al., Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective, in 1 THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 156, 159 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol
eds., 2015).
46 Id. at 157-58.
47 Id. at 156.
48 See Crane, supra note 3, at 1211-20.
49 Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2507 (“The more recent focus on economics has reduced the areas of per se illegality and increased the areas where the rule of reason operates
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and the shift in the United States from hostility to eventual embrace of efficiencies in both the Merger Guidelines50 and case-law analysis.51
The US experience is worth noting as an example for other jurisdictions, even those with significantly different institutional designs, largely
because of the important changes that the United States implemented. One
notable change was the creation of a distinct group of economists within the
antitrust agencies, including a chief economist and staff, who are not subordinate to agency lawyers.52 This institutional design allows for a distinct
economic voice to influence case selection and analysis, helping to ensure
that there is an economic basis for enforcement decisions.53
Empirical work suggests that overt politics not driven by antitrust economics has, for the most part, become a nonissue in US merger enforcement in recent decades.54 As one economist notes, “[p]opulism was forced
to a fringe position.”55 Earlier studies of US merger control examining the
1980s suggested that there were noneconomic factors at play in merger
control.56 The same work also found that the recommendations of economists carried less weight than those of agency lawyers.57 A greater role for
economists merely shifts “political” antitrust from noneconomic politics
(such as industrial policy) to “politics” within economics (i.e., how to decide the difficult cases “on the margins” based on economic theory and
empirics that may not always be clear).58
2.

Industrial Policy in European Antitrust

In Europe, path dependency based on multiple goals of antitrust remains a fundamental characteristic of European case law,59 with more of an
because of procompetitive justifications for the business behavior. A similar move has been underway in
the merger control area.” (footnote omitted)).
50 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10
(2010), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,104, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
51 See Greene & Sokol, supra note 35, at 2044- 49.
52 Froeb et al., supra note 41, at 569-70.
53 Lawrence J. White, Economics, Economists, and Antitrust: A Tale of Growing Influence, in
BETTER LIVING THROUGH ECONOMICS 232 (John J. Siegfried ed., 2010).
54 See id. at 232-33.
55 Malcolm B. Coate, Bush, Clinton, Bush: Twenty Years of Merger Enforcement at the Federal
Trade Commission 19 (Sept. 29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1314924.
56 E.g., Coate, Test, supra note 40, at 15.
57 Id. at 12.
58 See McChesney et al., supra note 45, at 156-58.
59 See, e.g., BEN VAN ROMPUY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: THE SOLE CONCERN OF MODERN
ANTITRUST POLICY? NON-EFFICIENCY CONSIDERATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 101 TFEU 16 (2012); Liza
Lovdahl Gormsen, The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisa-
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interventionist flavor than in the United States.60 This is due to the multiple
goals of European Commission (“EC”) competition law on the books, including industrial-policy concerns.61 Even if the Directorate-General of
Competition (“DG Comp”) states that its sole goal is consumer welfare,62
European case law remains far more favorable for a finding of competitionlaw infringement than in the United States, where the shift to a singular
goal of antitrust and the primacy of economic analysis has led to more ruleof-reason analysis and less intervention.63 In Europe, the stronginterventionist case law and enforcement also operate in the shadow of the
law—serving as leverage to be used against firms that are under investigation, in order to extract greater concessions in consent agreements.
An examination of European cases explains why European antitrust is
more prone to industrial policy. The European Court of Justice first used
the term “consumer welfare” in 2012, in Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet.64 Far more common are European cases under the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) Articles 10165 and 10266 that
have multiple goals as the basis for their analyses.67 In the TFEU 101 context, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse
tion of Article 82 EC, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 329, 329 (2007); Alberto Pera, Changing Views of Competition, Economic Analysis and EC Antitrust Law, 4 EUR. COMPETITION J. 127, 131-33 (2008); Heike
Schweitzer, The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Section 2 Sherman Act and Article
82 EC, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2007: A REFORMED APPROACH TO ARTICLE 82 EC
119, 138-39 (Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Mel Marquis eds., 2008).
60 See generally FRANCESCO RUSSO ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMISSION DECISIONS ON
COMPETITION: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK ANTITRUST AND MERGER CASES 113-97
(2010) (analyzing and classifying all European Commission decisions from 1962 through 2009).
61 See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN
EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 8-9 (2015).
62 See Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2513.
63 See William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement
Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 464 (2003).
64 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet, ¶ 42 (Mar. 27, 2012), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=121061&pageIndex=0&doclang=en
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=65759 (“[I]t is for the dominant undertaking to show that the
efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract any likely negative
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are
likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement
of those gains in efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most
existing sources of actual or potential competition.” (emphasis added)).
65 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47.
66 Id. art. 102.
67 Raimundas Moisejevas & Ana Novosad, Some Thoughts Concerning the Main Goals of Competition Law, 20 JURISPRUDENCE 627, 634-35 (2013) (“Analysis of the practice of the Court of Justice
and the Commission does not allow identifying clearly the one main, dominating goal of the competition
law. In most cases, courts mention goals such as protection of the effective competition, protection of
the competitors and protection of the consumers.”).
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Mededingingsautoriteit68 explains that “[TFEU 101], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure
of the market and thus competition as such.”69 Similar language appears in
the TFEU 102 context.70 Until this case law is cleaned up in a manner similar to the shift in the United States from the mid-1970s to the present,71 European enforcement will implicitly have an industrial-policy flavor to it.
This type of case-law path dependency that is a part of antitrust enforcement in Europe also threatens the economic growth of more dynamic economies in South and East Asia, as these jurisdictions rely upon European
case law for guidance in their respective competition systems.72
Historical factors and path dependency explain the EC’s greater orientation toward industrial policy in merger control.73 The core purpose of European competition law was to further market integration over other factors
such as efficiency.74 This meant that efficiency played a lesser role in the
original formulation of European competition law.75 One might suggest that
a reading of Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland76 (a merger case arising soon
after the 1989 merger rules on the failing-firm defense were established)
expressed the tension between industrial policy and competition policy—at
least within the failing-firm-defense context.77
Because lawyers played a significant role in merger enforcement,
while economists historically played a minor role, the EC’s decisions to
challenge mergers may have lacked a rigorous economic justification.78
This too has changed due to the institutionalization of greater economic
analysis, including the creation of a chief economist and an economics staff
68 Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v. Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, 2009 E.C.R. I-04529.
69 Id. ¶ 38; see also Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P & C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Servs. Unlimited v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-09291, ¶¶ 62-64.
70 See Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-00527, ¶¶ 2223; Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-09555, ¶ 176; Joined Cases C468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lelos kai Sia EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proionton, 2008
E.C.R. I-07139, ¶¶ 68-69; C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-02331, ¶ 106.
71 See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 36, at 52-55.
72 See, e.g., Steve Harris & Akira Inoue, Japan, in GLOBAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK
440, 452 (D. Daniel Sokol, Daniel Crane & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2014).
73 GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 61, at 8-21.
74 Blair & Sokol, Welfare Standards, supra note 11, at 2502.
75 See id.
76 Commission Decision 91/619, Case No. IV/M.053, 1991 O.J. (L 334) 42 (EC).
77 Id. at 58-59. The first time the failing-firm defense was used in European law was in Kali und
Salz/MdK/Treuhand in 1993. See Commission Decision 94/449, Case No. IV/M.308, 1994 O.J. (L 186)
38, 49 (EC).
78 See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 61, at 20-21 (noting that while the importance of economic
analysis and number of economists in the European Union are increasing, court reliance on previous
case law continues to limit the role of economic reasoning in EU merger cases).
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not subordinate to lawyers, as well as a series of cases that reversed EC
challenges based on insufficient economic analysis.79
The earlier case law and institutional approaches have impacted the
current structure and nature of European merger and conduct enforcement
in terms of state intervention.80 Quantitative research supports that, at present, Europe more strictly enforces merger regulation than the United
States.81 Path dependency and earlier nonefficiency legacy may play some
role in this orientation towards greater enforcement.82 One could frame Europe’s wariness regarding vertical restraints (including vertical mergers) as
an expression of this same sort of legacy.83 Thus, more aggressive European
challenges to vertical mergers may be as much political (based on a concern
for the competitive process)84 as economic—and represent a key difference
with the United States on competition law and economics.85
Another cause of the development of noneconomic factors in European merger control was what some claimed to be anti-American bias.86 Empirical work analyzing the period of the 1990s found that there was protectionism involved in European merger control.87 DG Comp had a higher
probability of intervening against non-European firms when there were
European competitors in the same market.88 Professor Nihat Aktas and his
colleagues examined if foreign acquiring firms were subject to greater antitrust intervention than domestic acquiring firms when local competitor
firms were harmed, observing distinct cases from 1990 to 2000.89 They
79

RUSSO ET AL., supra note 60, at 4-5 & n.11.
See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 61, at 17-21.
81 See Bergman et al., supra note 7, at 89.
82 See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 61, at 51-62.
83 See James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 639, 661 (2005).
84 Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control,
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 461-64 (2002).
85 James Cooper et al., A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and
Conglomerate Mergers on Competition, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 785, 791-92 & n.27 (2005).
86 See George L. Priest & Franco Romani, Commentary, The GE/Honeywell Precedent, WALL ST.
J., June 20, 2001, at A18, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB992994589433979465 (“When the European
Commission states that politics will be irrelevant to its decision, it means the political efforts of the U.S.
and other countries wanting economic progress, not the politics of Rolls-Royces and Thales, which hope
for regulatory action to save them from the effects of aggressive competition.”).
87 Nihat Aktas et al., Is European M&A Regulation Protectionist?, 117 ECON. J. 1096, 1109-11
(2007) [hereinafter Aktas et al., European M&A Regulation]; Nihat Aktas et al., Market Response to
European Regulation of Business Combinations, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 731, 755-56
(2004); I. Serdar Dinc & Isil Erel, Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 J. FIN. 2471,
2473 (2013); Tomaso Duso et al., The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using
Stock Market Data, 50 J.L. & ECON. 455, 470 (2007). On the use of stock-market-return event studies in
competition policy, see Tomaso Duso et al., Is the Event Study Methodology Useful for Merger Analysis? A Comparison of Stock Market and Accounting Data, 30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 186, 191 (2010).
88 See Aktas et al., European M&A Regulation, supra note 87, at 1110-12.
89 Id. at 1100, 1109.
80
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found that the joint effect of a given bidder’s nationality (foreign versus
domestic European) and whether there were European competitors involved
led to abnormal stock returns.90 They concluded that, “[f]aced with the empirical facts, a cynical observer might doubt the good intentions of European regulators.”91
Similarly, Professors Serdar Dinc and Isil Erel analyzed the largest
twenty-five merger targets (measured by market capitalization of the respective target firms) from the first fifteen EU member states during the
period from 1997 to 2006.92 They found that, “instead of staying neutral,
governments of countries where the target firms are located tend to oppose
foreign merger attempts while supporting domestic ones that create socalled national champions, or companies that are deemed to be too big to be
acquired.”93 This legacy of European industrial policy has troubling implications for robust antitrust enforcement.
3.

Industrial Policy in Chinese Antitrust

A number of authors claim that industrial policy plays a role in Chinese antitrust.94 Previous empirical work on Chinese antitrust in the merger
context demonstrates how political Chinese merger control can be.95 The
most important finding has to do with the direct intervention of other parts
of government within the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic
of China (“MOFCOM”) merger review process.96 In short, other government ministries need to sign off on merger approval.97 Negotiations between MOFCOM and these other parts of the Chinese government can span
many months (sometimes with the knowledge of the merging parties—but
not always).98 These other parts of government can wield significant influence by placing certain conditions on the merger approval and may ask
questions or force concessions by the merging parties that have nothing to
do with competitive effects.99

90

Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1118.
92 Dinc & Erel, supra note 87, at 2472.
93 Id. at 2504.
94 E.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 696 (2015); Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China’s
Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 671, 706 (2014).
95 D. Daniel Sokol, Merger Control Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1,
3, 35 (2013).
96 Id. at 20-26, 35.
97 Id. at 33, 35.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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Another important finding is the significance of third-party-competitor
complaints.100 If there is a Chinese company (particularly an SOE, or stateowned enterprise) that competes within the same relevant market, or may
merely be thinking of entering the market, the merger notification receives
significantly more scrutiny.101 This is the case even if the competitive effects are negligible, while in other merger systems, the deal would fall within a presumptive safe harbor because the market shares of the merging parties might be under 25 percent.102 As a result of these pressures, some of
MOFCOM’s decisions have been attempts to frame political concerns within the language of economic analysis, even when the economic analysis
undertaken is more rudimentary than what one might find in Western Europe or North America.103
Industrial policy in China is the concern of a more recent practitioner
analysis published by the United States Chamber of Commerce
(“USCC”).104 This report suggests that there is industrial policy at play in
both merger and conduct cases in Chinese antitrust with regard to merger
remedies and intellectual property and antitrust issues, among other areas.105
Similar reports by the US-China Business Council (“USCBC”)106 and the
European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (“EUCCC”)107 echo these
concerns.
II.

LACK OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AS A WAY TO PUSH INDUSTRIAL
POLICY IN ANTITRUST

The global pressure points in industrial policy include competitors
misusing antitrust and taking advantage of the lack of due process across
antitrust authorities. Agencies sometimes find out about potential anticompetitive behavior through competitor complaints.108 However, competitors
also have the incentive to use complaints to get an investigation started
100

Id. at 26-27, 35.
Sokol, supra note 95, at 21-26, 35.
102 Id. at 35.
103 Id. at 23-25, 35.
104 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMPETING INTERESTS IN CHINA’S COMPETITION LAW
ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW APPLICATION AND THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
(2014), https://www.uschamber.com/report/competing-interests-chinas-competition-law-enforcementchinas-anti-monopoly-law-application.
105 Id. at 13-27.
106 U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, COMPETITION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA 5 (2014),
https://www.uschina.org/reports/competition-policy-and-enforcement-china.
107 Press Release, European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European Chamber Releases
Statement on China AML-Related Investigations (Aug. 13, 2014) [hereinafter, EUCCC, Statement on
China Investigations], http://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/press-releases/2132.
108 See D. Daniel Sokol, The Strategic Use of Public and Private Litigation in Antitrust as Business
Strategy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 693 (2012).
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even when the conduct in question is not anticompetitive.109 When government can be made to expend its own resources in bringing a case, inefficient competitors can misuse antitrust law.110 Procedural problems that do
not allow firms targeted for investigation to know the nature of the complaints against them aid in this misuse.
This Part explains the importance of transparency and due process in
antitrust. Without a robust procedural-fairness regime, antitrust can develop
an implicit industrial policy that favors inefficient competitors rather than
an antitrust policy that promotes consumer welfare. Systems with limited
procedural fairness are ripe for abuse by third parties who might use antitrust strategically. A number of companies may front local firms to raise
concerns to antitrust authorities as a way to punish more efficient rivals
around the world, raising these more efficient firms’ costs.111
Procedural fairness is an important issue for the rule of law and for effective antitrust regulation.112 In her keynote speech at the American Bar
Association’s “Antitrust in Asia: China” conference in May 2014, Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) Chairwoman Edith Ramirez explained: “Good
process leads to effective decisions and bolsters the legitimacy of competition enforcement. In contrast, deficient process contributes to suboptimal
decisions and breeds disrespect for competition law and for competition
agencies.”113 She then articulated four aspects of procedural fairness that are
central to the practice of transparency and due process in the United States:
[Procedural fairness permits] legal representation for the parties under investigation, including allowing the participation of local and international counsel; notifying the parties of the
legal and factual bases of an investigation and sharing the evidence on which the agency relies; facilitating direct and meaningful engagement between the parties and the investigative
staff and decision-makers; and ensuring internal checks and balances on decision-making
114
within the agency.

109

Id.
Id. at 696-97.
111 See id.
112 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Core Competition Agency Principles: Lessons Learned at the FTC, Keynote Address at the ABA’s Antitrust in Asia Conference 2 (May 22,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/314151/140522abachinakeynote
.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 2-3. Procedural fairness has been a significant issue for both U.S. agencies. See Christine
A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Procedural Fairness, Address
at the 13th Annual Competition Conference of the International Bar Association 1 (Sept. 12, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/249974.htm (“Regardless of the substantive outcome of a
government investigation, it is important that parties involved know that the process used to reach that
outcome was fair. The two concerns—substance and process—go hand in hand. Complaints about
process lead to concern that substantive results are flawed, whereas a fair, predictable, and transparent
process bolsters the legitimacy of the substantive outcome.”).
110
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Concerns regarding the need for procedural fairness in antitrust
(whether pertaining to mergers, cartels, or other conduct) are not unique to
the US experience.115 Indeed, various international antitrust organizations
have echoed these concerns, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Competition Committee and the
International Competition Network (“ICN”).116 The business community
has also pushed for increased procedural fairness. The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) issued a recommended framework for international best practices in competition law enforcement proceedings, highlighting seven different themes for best practices.117 More recently, the ICN established an Investigative Process Project, coheaded by the FTC and DG
Comp.118 Further, a number of free-trade agreements include procedural
fairness among the provisions in their competition-policy chapters.119
A recent survey conducted by the USCC found that, globally, there
were some problems regarding transparency and due process.120 Roughly
two-thirds of the respondents identified that competition authorities were
either inconsistent in providing due process or failed to provide sufficient
procedural safeguards.121 Similarly, practitioners expressed concerns as to
why certain information remains confidential, as well as consistency and
timeliness regarding transparency.122
At times, procedural concerns have emerged in the United States123 and
Europe.124 However, issues of procedural fairness and transparency have
115

See Ramirez, supra note 112, at 2.
Sokol, supra note 95, at 29.
117 Comm’n on Competition, Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Recommended Framework for
International Best Practices in Competition Law Enforcement Proceedings, at 1-8, ICC Doc. 225/666
(Mar. 8, 2010) [hereinafter, ICC, Recommended Framework], http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Policies
/2010/Recommended-framework-for-international-best-practices-in-competition-law-enforcementproceedings/.
118 ICN, Investigative Process Project: Issues Paper and Mandate, at 1 (2012), http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc799.pdf.
119 See, e.g., United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 16.1.2, June 6, 2003,
Temp. State Dep’t No. 04-35, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/
asset_upload_file616_4010.pdf. For a coding of these agreements in terms of their content, see D.
Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231, 285 (2008).
120 SEAN HEATHER ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE TREATMENT OF CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION IN COMPETITION/ANTITRUST ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: A PRACTITIONER’S
SURVEY 3-4 (2014), https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/A%20Practitioner%E2%80%99s
%20Survey%20on%20the%20Use%20of%20Confidential%20Information%20in%20Competition%20P
roceedings%20-%20April%202014_1.pdf.
121 Id. at 5, 42-43.
122 Id. at 3, 11-12.
123 See, e.g., D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1055, 1134-35 (2010); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Reflections on Procedure at the
Federal Trade Commission, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Masters Course IV, at 5 (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/080925roschreflections.pdf.
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emerged most noticeably in reports regarding Chinese antitrust by the
USCC125 and USCBC,126 as well as in a statement by the EUCCC.127 These
documents raised concerns about due process in Chinese antitrust regulation.128 These concerns relate to the lack of effective representation, the use
of industrial policy by third parties, and procedural tools that do not allow
for the most effective advocacy to achieve efficient outcomes.129
While Chinese antitrust law serves as a prominent example for the
need to improve due process (and its potential abuse for industrial-policy
purposes),130 what has been less public (but just as alarming) is that many of
these concerns are not unique to China.131 As other authorities increase their
enforcement activity, taking ever-complex and high-profile cases, the ofteninadequate procedural safeguards and lack of due process come into sharper
focus.132 For example, high-profile cases with procedural-fairness issues

124

See, e.g., David Anderson & Rachel Cuff, Cartels in the European Union: Procedural Fairness
for Defendants and Claimants, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 385, 386 (2011); Jaime Flattery, Balancing
Efficiency and Justice in EU Competition Law: Elements of Procedural Fairness and Their Impact on
the Right to a Fair Hearing, 7 COMPETITION L. REV. 53, 53 (2010); Kyriakos Fountoukakos & Camille
Puech-Baron, What Happens in Luxembourg Stays in Luxembourg: Confidentiality Issues in Competition Law Proceedings Before the EU Courts, 5 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 331, 332 (2014).
125 JEREMIE WATERMAN & SEAN HEATHER, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMPETING
INTERESTS IN CHINA’S COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: CHINA’S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW
APPLICATION AND THE ROLE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 47-53 (2014), https://www.uschamber.
com/sites/default/files/aml_final_090814_final_locked.pdf.
126 U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 106, at 14-15.
127 See EUCCC, Statement on China Investigations, supra note 107.
128 Id.; WATERMAN & HEATHER, supra note 125, at 49.
129 EUCCC, Statement on China Investigations, supra note 107; WATERMAN & HEATHER, supra
note 125, at ii.
130 See Sokol, supra note 95, at 35.
131 See, e.g., Shuya Hayashi, A Study on the 2013 Amendment to the Antimonopoly Act of Japan—
Procedural Fairness Under the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, 7 Y.B. ANTITRUST & REG. STUD., no. 10,
2014, at 85, 87-88 (examining the procedural concerns with the 2013 Amendment to the Japanese Antimonopoly Act).
132 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Enforcement In China—What
Next?, Remarks at the Second Annual GCR Live Conference 3 (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/public_statements/582501/140915gcrlive.pdf.
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have arisen in other jurisdictions, including Europe,133 Korea,134 and Japan.135
An absence of effective procedural fairness impairs effective competition law and policy.136 It also makes it more difficult for businesses to plan
effectively because of the risk involved in antitrust enforcement that is
based not on the particular conduct in question but on the uncertainty due to
uneven enforcement.137 Yet, in addition to the lack of procedural fairness
hurting economic performance and efficiency, it also hurts antitrust authorities.
Procedural fairness should not be conceptualized as merely preventing
downside risk for an antitrust authority. Rather, there are tangible benefits
to antitrust authorities fully embracing procedural fairness, including better
information gained from evidence gathered as a result of improved procedural fairness. Such information can assist an antitrust authority in better
shaping its competition policy and enforcement prioritization. This better
information gathering in turn allows cases to move more smoothly through
the pipeline, with more predictability on timing and key stages for both
merger and conduct cases. It also gives firms under investigation a sense of
how to both respond effectively to agency requests for information and help
agencies in their decisionmaking.
III. BAD INDUSTRIAL POLICY LEADS TO BAD COMPETITION POLICY
A concern about the mixing of economic and noneconomic goals of
regulation is that this mixture more readily allows for regulatory capture by
the sector regulator.138 The extensive literature on public choice provides
both theoretical and empirical support to the thesis of regulatory capture by
sector regulators.139 Regulatory capture by sector regulators may be more
133 See Comm’n on Competition, ICC, Due Process In EU Antitrust Proceedings: Comments on
and Analysis of the European Commission’s and EU Courts’ Antitrust Proceedings, at 1, ICC Doc.
225/717 (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.iccindiaonline.org/policy-statement/may2014/DueProcesPaper.
pdf; Maciej Bernatt, The Compatibility of Deferential Standard of Judicial Review in the EU Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 12-13 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447884.
134 See ICC, Recommended Framework, supra note 117, at 2. For attempts by the KFTC to improve due process concerns, see Jae-Chan Jeong, Korea: Korea Fair Trade Commission, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV., http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/69/sections/235/chapters/2755/koreakorea-fair-trade-commission/ (last visited July 21, 2015).
135 See Hayashi, supra note 131, at 95 & n.35.
136 See Ohlhausen, supra note 132, at 2 (“[F]or a competition authority, predictability, transparency, and fairness translate into five actionable agency goals . . . .”).
137 See id. at 2-3.
138 D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special
Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 119, 133-135 (2009) [hereinafter Sokol, Limiting Interventions].
139 See generally DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III (2003).
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severe than by antitrust enforcers for two reasons. The first is that sector
regulators have more concentrated interest groups, which makes capture
more likely.140 The multiple missions (including noneconomic ones) of sector regulators also create additional political pressure points for the executive or legislative branches of government to use in order to leverage noncompetition concerns.141 This may impact the outcome of particular cases.
Competition advocacy—the ability of agencies to sway other parts of government based on economic arguments on the merits of competition142—
serves as a way to reduce the competitive harms of such regulation.143
The second factor that compounds the capture is the pursuit of “public
interest,” or even the veneer of public interest.144 Whereas some notion of
efficiency may be (at least in practice) the only factor that determines outcomes in many antitrust systems, sector agencies may need to balance efficiency concerns with the preservation of competitors who may provide consumer choice and diversity.145 Sometimes these concerns may be valid, but
other times they are the result of rent seeking.146 The point is not to distinguish between the two but merely to note that sector regulation has divergent interests from antitrust that are not based on efficiency analysis.147 In
Europe, there are a number of areas where sector regulation seems to be
leading to outcomes that do not necessarily promote consumer welfare.148
These areas include data privacy149 and merger remedies not based on anticompetitive concerns.150 Both are areas in which there is pressure from oth140

Sokol, Limiting Interventions, supra note 138, at 133.
See id. at 142.
142 James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of Competition
Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1091 (2005) (“Competition advocacy, broadly, is the
use of . . . expertise in competition, economics, and consumer protection to persuade governmental
actors at all levels of the political system and in all branches of government to design policies that
further competition and consumer choice.”).
143 Eleanor M. Fox & Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition―The Role for Competition Law, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 775-76 (2014).
144 McChesney et al., supra note 45, at 157.
145 See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards
Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 394 (2006).
146 See McChesney et al., supra note 45, at 162.
147 David L. Meyer, We Should Not Let the Ongoing Rationalization of Antitrust Lead to the Marginalization of Antitrust, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1175, 1189 (2008).
148 See ROGER VAN DEN BERGH & PETER CAMESASCA, EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND
ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 134-36 (2006).
149 Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 91 (2012) (“For a
preview of just how chilling that effect might be, consider the fact that the right to be forgotten can be
asserted not only against the publisher of content (such as Facebook or a newspaper) but against search
engines like Google and Yahoo that link to the content.”).
150 Nicolas Petit, State-Created Barriers to Exit? The Example of the Acquisition of Alstom by
General Electric 23 (Feb. 17, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2521378.
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er parts of government to have a competition-law “solution” for what is not
a competition problem.151
This behavior abroad contrasts with the US experience. Antitrust policy has become so technocratic in the United States that, in recent administrations, presidential statements on antitrust policy have been sparse.152
Consequently, it is quite telling that President Barack Obama recently
called out the European Union for infusing industrial policy in the competition policy and consumer protection arenas.153 In an interview, President
Obama explained:
“[S]ometimes their vendors—their service providers—who can’t compete with ours, are essentially trying to set up some roadblocks for our
companies to operate effectively there. We have owned the Internet. Our
companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it, in ways they can’t
compete. And oftentimes what is portrayed as high-minded positions on
issues sometimes is designed to carve out their commercial interests.”154
European competition law and policy will continue to suffer from industrial-policy intrusions so long as Europe fails to clean up its case law
and take a more active stance in its competition advocacy. Consumer welfare decreases as a result. The same goes for other jurisdictions.155
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a broader competition-policy system that is neutral towards other policy areas—or, in other words, it recommends the
adoption of an antitrust standard based exclusively on consumer welfare
rooted in economic efficiency.156 Antitrust law and policy should become
completely technocratic, so that antitrust concerns are the only ones that are
taken into account.157 Any concerns regarding industrial policy, national
151 For a recent formulation of antitrust, consumer protection, and data protection, see Maureen K.
Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer Protection, and the Right (Approach) to
Privacy, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2561563.
152 Crane, supra note 3, at 1160-61.
153 Liz Gannes, Obama Says Europe’s Aggressiveness Toward Google Comes From Protecting
Lesser Competitors, RECODE (Feb. 13, 2015), http://recode.net/2015/02/13/obama-says-europesaggressiveness-towards-google-comes-from-protecting-lesser-competitors/ (“Obama said the European
companies were sore losers and were using their governments to gain footing against American rivals.”).
154 Id.
155 Yong Huang et al., Essential Facilities Doctrine and Its Application in Intellectual Property
Space Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2015).
156 While the Author has previously argued for a total-welfare standard, here, the broader point is
that the sole standard for antitrust should be the political choice between antitrust-specific welfare
standards, not between antitrust economics and other nonantitrust-economics considerations. The easier
standard to adopt globally based on administrability concerns is consumer welfare.
157 Randolph W. Tritell, Meeting the Challenges of the Evolving International Antitrust Landscape,
22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1269, 1275 (2015) (“Convergence around principles of sound economic analy-
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security, and other policy areas should be addressed outside of the antitrustlaw context. This will allow antitrust law to become nonpolitical and more
technocratic. It will also confine noncompetition economic considerations
to those arenas that are more prone to public choice concerns, such as sector
regulation, the legislative process, or executive fiat. These spheres are better equipped than antitrust law to deal with political trade-offs.
With regard to these types of trade-offs that effect a broader competition policy, antitrust can robustly aid in reducing the economic distortions
that interest-group trade-offs create.158 Areas such as consumer protection
and data privacy,159 disruptive technologies in the transportation sector (e.g.,
Uber),160 and professional regulation161 particularly need the support of
greater competition advocacy.
The stubborn legacy of industrial policy within antitrust case law can
be removed, in part, with more (and better) economic analysis, via an iterative process that improves over time.162 As the sophistication of antitrust
agencies’ economic analysis and the application of such analysis to cases
improve, more efficient outcomes will follow.163 Privileging overt state intervention within antitrust through the explicit inclusion of noneconomic
concerns would hinder antitrust law and policy in many jurisdictions and
decrease consumer welfare.164 Refining case law to reflect economic principles and putting economists on equal footing with lawyers within agencies
are other ways to provide a check on industrial policy’s implicit creep into
antitrust.
As great as the industrial-policy problem is in traditional antitrust cases, its impact is even more pronounced in case law and agency action in the
dynamic economic setting—particularly in fast-moving markets where intervention tends to reduce consumer welfare even more. These markets are
typified by rapid technological change and innovation.165 The innovation

sis and maximizing consumer welfare enables agencies to implement competition laws in a way that
promotes economic growth and development, facilitates cooperation among competition agencies, and
fosters a predictable legal environment for businesses.”).
158 See Cooper, Pautler & Zywicki, supra note 142, at 1100.
159 James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, U.S. Convergence with International Competition
Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1582 (2010).
160 Daniel A. Crane, Tesla, Dealer Franchise Laws, and the Politics of Crony Capitalism, IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 4), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2566436.
161 Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face
Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1135 (2014).
162 See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust
Institutions, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 14 (2012).
163 See Kovacic, Intellectual DNA, supra note 43, at 79.
164 See, e.g., Healey, supra note 4, at 219-20.
165 J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION
L. & ECON. 581, 585 (2009); Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of
Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 166 (2010).
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can be in new products, services, or platforms.166 And, because high-tech
markets change rapidly, market power may be transient.167 In the high-tech
setting, agencies must be particularly careful when analyzing the market
and the facts to ensure that merger control does not reduce firms’ incentives
to innovate or chill other investment decisions that would otherwise lead to
enhanced innovation.168
The concept of the ephemeral nature of market power originates from
Professor Joseph Schumpeter’s views on creative destruction.169 Due to the
nature of technological change, firms compete for a market through innovation and other strategies that are highly disruptive to existing markets.170
This is competition for the market rather than competition in the market.171
In these circumstances, prediction is more complex and difficult.172 If there
is no clear theory of harm and no facts to support a determination of harm,
aggressive intervention risks chilling procompetitive innovation.173 In some
cases, the best remedy may be no remedy at all, as evidenced in a number
of cases across the United States,174 Europe,175 and other leading jurisdictions.176

166

See Sidak & Teece, supra note 165, at 582.
Renata B. Hesse, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Criminal & Civil Operations, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, At the Intersection of Antitrust & High-Tech: Opportunities for Constructive Engagement,
Remarks as Prepared for the Conference on Competition & IP Policy in High-Tech. Indus. 5 (Jan. 22,
2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/303152.pdf.
168 Professor Thomas Cotter summarizes the potential trade off as “[t]he obvious problem, once we
accept the principle that any conduct that threatens some harm to innovation or creativity (no matter
how speculative) properly could give rise to antitrust liability, is knowing where to stop.” Thomas F.
Cotter, Innovation and Antitrust Policy, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 132, 146 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 2015).
169 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950). See also
Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 575, 587 (2007) (“As a general rule, competition does not just lead firms to produce more and
charge less; it encourages them to innovate as well.”).
170 See WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH
TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 227-29 (2007).
171 See Baker, supra note 169, at 577; Michael A. Carrier, Two Puzzles Resolved: Of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Markets, 93 IOWA L. REV. 393, 396 (2008).
172 See Baker, supra note 169, at 575 & n.1.
173 See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 170, at 244; William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software
Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications
Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 82 (2007).
174 Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n, In re Google, Inc., No. 111-0163, at 3 (F.T.C. Jan. 3,
2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/295971/130103googlesearch
stmtofcomm.pdf (“Product design is an important dimension of competition and condemning legitimate
product improvements risks harming consumers. Reasonable minds may differ as to the best way to
design a search results page and the best way to allocate space among organic links, paid advertisements, and other features. And reasonable search algorithms may differ as to how best to rank any given
website. Challenging Google’s product design decisions in this case would require the Commission—or
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Despite the focus of many antitrust agencies and international organizations on antitrust issues in China,177 it is important to note that industrial
policy in antitrust is not just a China problem.178 Focusing solely on China
at the exclusion of other countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas allows
competition authorities in other regions to slide under the radar and perpetuates the intrusion of industrial policy into antitrust—harming consumer
welfare.

a court—to second-guess a firm’s product design decisions where plausible procompetitive justifications
have been offered, and where those justifications are supported by ample evidence.”).
175 Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc. v. Comm’n, ¶ 76 (Dec. 11, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145461&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ
=first&part=1&cid=44480.
176 See David S. Evans & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Qihoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision
by The Supreme Court, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L ASIA COLUMN, Oct. 21, 2014, at 2, https://www.
competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/AsiaOctober214.pdf.
177 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N OFFICE OF INT’L AFF., FY2013 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
REPORT 3 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/international-technical-assistanceprogram/ftc_office_of_international_affairs_fy2013_technical_assistance_report_1.pdf.
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